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PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF THE MENTALLY
ABNORMAL WITNESS
THE outcome of trials depends in large part on human testimony. A
jury's ' job is to find the facts, and often the sole evidence of the facts is
what witnesses say on the stand. The job is hard enough when the jury
must rely on a mentally normal 2 witness whose testimony may be marred
by flaws in his observation, recollection, narration or veracity.8 It becomes
even more difficult when a witness is the victim of a mental abnormality I
which makes him incapable of describing what actually occurred.' For
such witnesses may appear remarkably lucid and credible to the average
jury.6 Unlike the untruths of normal people, which usually spring from
readily understandable motives, the distortions of abnormal people stem
largely from deep-seated personality disturbances.7 And these disturbances
can often be discerned only by the trained psychiatrist.' To help the jury
evaluate the credibility of abnormal witnesses, a new technique 9 has made
1. The terms "jury" and "jurors" are used here to designate fact finders in civil and
criminal trials; whatever is said about juries is equally applicable to trial judges who must
act as fact finders where there is no jury.
2. The term "normal" is used here to designate the mentally healthy as distinct from
the mentally ill or abnormal. "Mental illness" or "mental abnormality" are used here
synonymously to designate the class of psychobiological disturbances not caused by any spe-
cific bodily organ. See ZLROORG, MIND, MEDICINE, AND MAN 51-65 (1943).
3. See 3 WIGMoa, EVIDENCE § 876 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WwMORE).
See also note 9 infra.
4. See note 2 supra.
5. It should be understood that not every mental abnormality impairs a witness'
faculties in this manner. For those that do, see pages 1326-31 infra. This comment
deals only with the latter type of abnormality.
6. The great majority of psychological illnesses show little or no outward change
in demeanor or social attitude. HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, A TEXTooK OF PSYCHIATRY,
101 (6th ed. 1947). See also OVERHOLSER & RICHMOND, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 9-10
(1947); Aschaffenburg, Psychiatry and Criminal Law, 32 J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3
(1941). For specific examples, see pages 1326-31 infra.
7. Altshuler, The Psychopathology of Lying, 6 J. op NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY 20 (1925) ; Karpman, Lying, 40 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (1949). By
far the most comprehensive analysis of truth perversion, with excellent case histories, is
HEALY & HEALY, PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION AND SWINDLING (1915). See
further GLUECK, STUDIES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 156-83 (1916) ; West, A Psycholog-
ical Theory of Law, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 767, 780-2
(Sayre ed. 1947). See also pages 1326-31 infra.
8. Although some disturbances are apparent to laymen, persons suffering from ob-
vious abnormalities are seldom called as witnesses in a lawsuit. The abnormalities of
those persons who are called generally cannot be discovered by laymen. For a case his-
tory in point, see HEALY & HEALY, op. cit. spra note 7, at 178M2.
9. The rules of evidence offer a wide variety of impeachment techniques for attacking a
witness' credibility. See, generally, 3 WIGMORE §§ 874-1046. Counsel may seek by these
techniques to show defects in a witness' powers of observation, recollection, or narra-
tion-the three essential elements of a testimonial assertion. Counsel may further attempt
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its bow-psychiatric 10 testimony.
Modern relaxation of competency requirements " for witnesses has in-
creased the need for psychiatry in the courtroom. Formerly the deranged
and defective were deemed incompetent.' 2 Today a sense of duty to speak
the truth and a bare minimum of ability to observe, remember and recount
qualify a witness to give testimony. 3 As a consequence, more and more
people with personality disorders and defects 14 now testify in criminal and
civil trials.' 5
to impeach a witness by demonstrating bad general character, bias, interest, or corrup-
tion. See Ladd, Credibility Tests-Currnt Trends, 89 U. op PA. L REv. 166 (1940).
The availability of impeachment techniques varies, however, depending on whether the
data is sought from the witness himself on cross-examination or by calling other witnesses.
See pages 1333-6 infra.
10. A good introductory article on psychiatry is Menninger, Psychiatry Today, 181
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 65 (Jan., 1948). For an excellent discussion of lay misconception
about psychiatry and the mind generally, see Z1.MOORG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3-71.
11. To be competent, a witness must have the capacity to (a) observe [District of
Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519 (1883) ; Thomas v. State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. 1 (1917)] ;
(b) remember [Worthington & Co. v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892) ; Hartford v.
Palmer, 16 Johns. 143 (N.Y. 1819)] ; and (c) communicate [Walker .v. State, 97 Ala. 85,
12 So. 83 (1892)]. On competency requirements generally, see Schneiderman v. Inter-
state Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 69 N.E.2d 293 (1946); Note, 148 A.LR. 1140
(1944). But '" .. [testimonial] capacity of person offered as a witness is presumed; i.e.
to exclude a witness on the ground of mental . .. incapacity the existence of the in-
capacity must be made to appear." 2 W GmoRE § 497.
Opposing counsel should object to a witness' qualifications as soon as a disqualifying
fact is apparent, either before the witness is sworn or while the witness is on the stand.
2 id. § 486. Otherwise, counsel may be deemed to have waived any objection. 2 id. § 586.
Moreover, one court has held that failure to object to a witness' competency will bar sub-
sequent attempts to impeach the witness by showing mental defects. State v. Teager, 222
Iowa 391, 269 NAY. 348 (1936).
Whenever an objection is made, the judge must conduct a voir dire examination out of
the jury's hearing. State v. Comeau-, 142 La. 651, 77 So. 489 (1918); White ,. State,
52 Miss. 216 (1876). In conducting this examination, the judge is not bound by the
ordinary rules of evidence. For example, he need not permit cross-examination of a wit-
ness called to disprove another witness' qualifications. 2 ,VIGMOnM § 487. And the judge
has full discretion to use any available aids, such as mental and psychological tests. See
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Etidencc-The Competency of
Witnesses, 37 YAix L.J. 1017, 1019 (1928). For an interesting account of a voir dire
examination, see Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 130 N. F 495 (1921). The
Tatisos examination is compared with standard psychological intelligence tests in Hutchins
& Slesinger, supra.
12. 2 WIGMORE § 492.
13. 2 id. § 501. See, e.g., Truttmann v. Truttmann, 328 Ill. 338, 159 N.E. 775 (1927);
Hancock v. Hallmann, 229 Vis. 127,281 NAV. 703 (1938).
14. Zilboorg estimates that at least one in every twenty persons of our population has
been or is going to be under some sort of psychiatric treatment. ZmLoorq, op. cit. mspra
note 2, at 133.
15. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 126 Aid. 223, 94 Atl. 774 (1915) (derangement not re-
sulting in extreme impairment of witness' faculties does not render a witness incompetent) ;
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DISORDERS AND DEFECTS AFFECTING CREDIBILITY
Mental Disorders
An individual's capacity to relate objective facts may be impaired by
disorders in his thinking, feeling, and behavior. These disorders are some-
times precipitated by physical factors, like concussion of the brain or exces-
sive use of alcohol or drugs. 6 But more often they are due to subtle non-
physical causes: when basic needs and desires cannot be satisfied harmon-
iously, intrapsychic conflicts result. 17
Psychoses. The major mental disorders are the psychoses."5 Psychotics
are those persons who have lost touch with reality; they are roughly the
group which lawyers call the "insane." 19 As witnesses, their veracity may
State v. Crouch, 130 Iowa 478, 107 N.W. 173 (1906) ("feeblemindedness" does not dis-
qualify). See also Wigmore's statement that the broad principle "now practically every-
where accepted" is that a "derangement or defect, in order to disqualify, must be such as
substantially negatives trustworthiness upon the specific subject of the testimony...." 2
WIGMORE § 492.
A trial court's determination of competency is subject to reversal only if it is a clear
abuse of discretion. Ruocco v. Logiocco, 104 Conn. 585, 134 At. 73 (1926) ; People v.
Washor, 196 N.Y. 104, 89 N.E. 441 (1909). See Note, 148 A.L.R. 1140 (1944).
16. Physical factors also include a wide range of serious diseases like epilepsy qnd
syphilis. The disorders associated with physical factors are generally the psychoses, See
pages 1326-8 infra; NoYEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 166-330 (2d ed. 1939)
OVERHOLSER & RICHMOND, Op. cit. supra note 6, at 60-122.
17. Such conflicts generally give rise to neurotic reactions. See pages 1328-30 infra.
But they may also be associated with psychoses like schizophrenia. See HENDERSON &
GI.LESPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 288-330.
The balancing of selfish desires and social inhibitions is a part of one's daily adaptations
to the stresses of life. However, such adaptation may be faulty, thereby leading to mental
or physical disturbances in the organism. For an analysis of the development of basic
motives and drives, see HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 123-38. See
generally, ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1948); MENNINGER, THe
HUMAN MIND (3d ed. 1947).
18. For the American and British classifications of the different types of disorders,
see HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 15-27. For a thorough discussion of
the dynamics, symptoms, and treatment of psychoses, see id., passim; NoYES, op. cit. supra
note 16, passim.
19. "Insanity" as a legal term denotes people who cannot differentiate between right
and wrong, according to the standards of their society. Consequently, such people are
held not to be responsible for criminal behavior. This test was formulated in M'Naghten's
case, 10 Clark & F. 200 (1843). See Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Crininal
Law, 16 B.U.L. REv. 322, 323-26 (1936) ; Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime:
A Survey, 32 COL. L. REv. 933, 935-43 (1932). The "insane" may include not only psychotics
but also extreme mental defectives, such as idiots and imbeciles. See pages 1330-31 in Ira.
But the term "insanity" has been practically rejected from the medical vocabulary.
"[K]nowledge of right and wrong are no longer conceived as concrete entities that either
are or are not. . . . The language of the law, while it might have been all right a hundred
or two years ago is no longer usable by the present-day psychiatrist .. " WurTr, IN-
SANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 104 (1923). The psychiatrist has instead a different set
of standards, based on the degree of disturbance in a psychobiological organism attempt-
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be impaired in varying degrees by their lack of capacity to observe, cor-
relate, or recollect actual events. Some alcoholic psychoses may result in
memory impairment followed by fabrication to fill in the gaps.3 It is pos-
sible for a psychotic to be aware of a portion of reality while entertaining
certain delusions about the rest of it. 21 While some psychotic disorders may
be discernible by lay juries, others may not. For example, every mental
hospital has patients whose intelligence and charm deceive visitors.2 2 But
these people really suffer from hallucinations and delusions 23 constructed by
processes operating unconsciously to serve some maladjusted need of the
personality.
2 4
Of all the psychotics, the most misleading to the layman is the paranoiac,
who entertains delusions of persecution or grandeur 5 but whose personality
may not appear as disturbed as that of other psychotics. No matter how
unfounded or absurd his delusions, the paranoiac may retain an appearance
of normality and react in normal fashion to matters outside his delusional
ing to adjust to its environment. OvER3aoLsER & RrcsHmoxo, op. cit. mipra note 6, at 9-11.
20. Memory gaps can be created by the damaging influence of active psychoses, al-
coholic or otherwise. The compensatory filling of such gaps is termed "confabulation."
Confabulation occurs in personalities unable to face inferiority and prone to erect defenses.
The toxic condition then acts as a precipitating factor, bringing to the surface desires that
could be repressed while the person was normal. Thus the content of confabulations, hav-
ing no basis in reality, is determined by unconscious desires. See ALEXANDER, op. cit.
mpra note 17, at 259-60; Karpman, supra note 7, at 148-9. For studies of alcoholism in
our society, see HA.PERN, STuDIEs or Co T~tusri Da=ucs (1946); Svnxcanr.s &
Carm s, ALCOHOL ONE MANs 11rEAT (1938).
21. A washwoman at a mental institution, for example, might claim that she is
Cleopatra. If asked why she, as Cleopatra, washes floors, she might answer that the "hos-
pital attendant would be angry" if she didn't. See the similar example in OvwanoLsan &
RIcHmOND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 9.
22. Ibid.
23. Delusions, illusions, and hallucinations have no counterpart in reality. They
differ only in the form of manifestation-delusions are false beliefs or ideas, illusions are
perceptual misinterpretations, and hallucinations are auditory misinterpretations. For a dis-
cussion of their occurrence in the mental disorders, see NovEs, op. cit. mipra note 16, at
96-111.
24. See the statement by West: "The human mind is endowed with varied and ade-
quate machinery for maintaining self respect. ... [It is] maintained by continuous dis-
tortions of the facts of life and its personal relationships. The psychological processes in-
volved include those of faulty perception, fantasy identification, selective remembering, pro-
jection, and rationalization." West, supra note 7, at 781.
25. Such delusions are rationalizations of hostile impulses which have broken through
the barriers of repression. For example, a person may blame his wife for infidelity be-
cause he himself suffers from impotence or from some shameful sexual experience, and
cannot admit either of these failings to himself. Or, having unfulfilled ambitions and
being unable to admit failure to himself, one may first blame his environment (delusions of
persecution) and later may come to believe that his ambitions have been attained (delu-
sions of grandeur). For a thorough discussion of the diagnosis and treatment of para-
noiacs, see HENDERSON & GILLEsPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 331420. See also As.xA1.Dmn,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 252-5; MENNiNGER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 85-9, 245-7.
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system. A good illustration is the "litigious paranoiac," 25 whose delusions
create grievances that he feels can only be settled by judicial fiat. His
career is generally touched off by a lawsuit whose outcome left him dis-
satisfied. Thereupon he begins a legal crusade as a civil plaintiff, ostensibly
to preserve his "rights," but actually to strengthen his sensitive insecurity
and protect the weak points of his personality. Throughout his career, he
generally remains free of hallucinations, conversationally adept, and prob-
ably intellectually superior to average people. 27 Generally pleading his own
case in court, he can quote voluminously from case books and statutes, and
his judgment on matters outside the field of his delusions remains largely
intact.28 The lay juror, uninformed of the paranoiac's career, will seldom
sense the presence of a disorder. And the paranoiac, adept at his business,
may often win his trumped-up case.
Neuroses. The lesser mental disorders are the neuroses or psychoneu-
roses. 29 Unlike the psychotic, who has usually broken with reality, the
neurotic's "inner defenses" generally remain sufficiently strong to maintain
undisturbed his grasp of reality and the external world. 3 Nevertheless,
memory lapses and delusions may accompany neurosis, especially in the
case of "hysteria." 3' Thus, a woman affilicted with "hysteria" neurosis
may actually believe she was raped by an innocent doctor, falsifying reality
to satisfy unconscious motives and unsatisfied wishes. 2 Similarly, an
"hysteric" suffering from forgetfulness may be moved by strong community
26. For a thorough discussion of this type of paranoia, with excellent case histories,
see GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 132-55. See also LIcHTENSTEIN & SMALL, A HAND-
BOOK OF PsYcHIATRY 221-5 (1943) ; OVERHOLSER & RIcHMOND, op. cit. supra note 6, at
158-9.
27. GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 133.
28. Id. at 136.
29. Neurosis is the most common form of mental illness. It develops whenever a
person cannot satisfy his emotional needs harmoniously without internal conflict. This
conflict may result from unsatisfactory past relationships with other people, or may arise
in relation to present hopes, ambitions, jealousies, and the like. In any case, the neurotic
keeps the conflict within himself, and develops such symptoms as phobias, obsessions, back-
aches, and stomach distress. For a thorough discussion of the causes, symptoms, and
treatment of neurosis, see HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, op. cit. vpra note 6, at 139-219;
NoYES, op. cit. supra note 16, at 331-94. A particularly good analysis of the dynamics of
neurotic behavior can be found in ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 193-205, 208-13.
For examples of the various neurotic types, see MENNINGER, Op. cit. supra note 17, at
134-50.
30. The difference between psychosis and neurosis is one of degree. Put another way,
the neurotic fights himself while the psychotic has given up the struggle. See HENDMESo &
GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 144; OVERHOLSER & RIcHMOND, op. cit. supra note 6, at
164.
31. On "hysteria" neurosis see generally HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, op. cit. stspra
note 6, at 171-93; ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 246-51.
32. See, e.g., the letters from Drs. William A. White, Karl A. Menninger, W. F.
Lorenz, and Otto M6nkem6ller, reprinted in 3 WiGMORE § 924a, discussing case histories
of false accusation by hysterical girls.
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pressures to fill in his memory gaps and condemn an innocent person. Yet
a neurotic often develops no outward change of personality and may, when
testifying, display great equanimity. 3 Hence a juror may regard the neu-
rotic witness as, at most, a bit "strange" or "eccentric," 31 without dis-
crediting his testimony. The true nature of the disorder may never be ap-
parent to the jury and an unfounded charge may be turned into a disas-
trous verdict.
Psychopathic Personality. A third type of disorder, akin to neurosis, is
the psychopathic personality. 5 All people, whether disordered or not, may
at times manifest asocial or amoral behavior. But the psychopath is dis-
tinguished as a "neurotic character" 11 by a consistent life pattern of "per-
verse" behavior.37 Being a neurotic sufferer, he has subtle conflicts which
disturb his being. But unlike other neurotics, whose conflicts find expres-
sion within the person itself, the psychopath gratifies his needs by his
conduct toward other people35l Unable to face reality in a socially acceptable
33. This is particularly true of the hysteric. Though the layman applies the word
"hysteric" to one who is highly emotional, easily upset or confused, and unable to behave
rationally in crises, the psychiatrist uses the word to describe a different set of symptoms.
As one psychiatrist explains, "The real hysteric, the one who has definite symptoms of
obscure psychological origin, may feel considerable discomfort on occasion, but he usually
displays an extraordinary equanimity. This is so striking a characteristic of such patients
that the leading French authority on the subject, Janet, was prompted to speak of la belle
indiffirence des hyst&iques." ZmBooRc, op. cit. supra note 2, at 130.
34. See the excellent examples cited in MENNINGER, op. cit. stipra note 17, at 135-43.
35. See generally KAHNT, PsYcHoPATic PEnsoNAirrEs (1931) ; NoyEs, op. cit. mupra
note 16, at 504-20; Coon, Psychiatry for the Lawyer, 31 CoRNEL L. Q. 466 (1946);
Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. CRL. L. & CRIxNOLOaY 584 (1950).
Because the term covers many different types of maladjusted people, rather than more
precise categories with exact syndromes, it has sometimes been called a general waste-
basket for every type of misbehavior. MENNINGER, PSYcHIATRY iN A TnounrLma Womw 263
(1948). Nevertheless, a psychopathic personality is no more difficult to diagnose than other
psychiatric conditions. ALEXANDER, Op. cit. supra note 17, at 236.
Some psychiatrists have suggested substitutes for this category. See Menninger,
Recognizing and Renaming "Psychopathic Personalities," 5 MENNINGEn CLINIC BuLL-rn;
150 (1941) ; Karpman, On the Need of Separating Psychopathy into Two Distinct Clinical
Types: the Symptomatic and the Idiopathic, 3 J. Crul. PsycHoPArnoLoy 112 (1941).
36. "Neurotic character" is Alexander's term for psychopathic personality. See
AI.axANDEa, op. cit. supra note 17, at 235.
37. As Mfenninger puts it, "'Perverse' describes these folk. ... They are headed
across-stream; they play at the game, but break all the rules. They are oftentimes pos-
sessed of good bodies, good looks, good manners; they lack neither intelligence nor per-
ceptual powers. Their defectiveness is in their emotional and volitional functioning. They
cannot keep out of trouble. They may achieve some good in the world, but the world
pays dearly for it, and the net total of the individual's life is in the red." ME.MUGER,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 150. For examples of psychopaths, see id. at 151-5. The Eng-
lish have classified such people as "moral imbeciles." See HE.NDEnso. & Gmxspm, op.
cit. supra. note 6, at 381-2; OvERHoLsER & RICHMOND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11. They
usually become tramps, vagrants, criminals, habitual (pathological) liars, or swindlers.
38. While neurotics fight themselves, the psychopaths fight society. They "are not
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manner, his behavior is repeatedly anti-social. Generally a person of un-
stable emotions and attachments, he tends to be insensitive, bizarre, and
paranoidal. Frequently, and of special import to juries, he engages in
pathological lying.
While the normal person lies 19 for self-protection or bias or for any num-
ber of conscious motives, the pathological liar may be driven by uncon-
scious motives to repetitious lying entirely disproportionate to any dis-
cernible end in view.41 In effect, he losses his capacity to relate the truth as
he himself sees it. The dope addict, for example, may lie pathologically
about topics unrelated to his drug habit. 41 Such lying may stem from a
feeling of shame (accentuated by the covert methods generally necessary
to obtain the drugs), from fear of the habit's consequences, and toxic weak-
ening of his social inhibitions.
In spite of his disordered personality, the psychopath who lies path-
ologically may appear quite normal, mild-mannered, and intelligent. His
lies are usually told with more conviction than those of normal people.
Even if his lying is exposed, he is capable of quick adjustment, 42 thereby
thoroughly misleading the layman. The psychiatrist, however, can separate
the pathological liar from the normal liar by correlating the psychopath's
maladaptive behavior into a diagnostic life pattern.
Mental Defects a
Unlike the disordered person, whose intelligence is rarely subnormal,
the mental defective has never attained average mental capacity.4" The fail-
ure may be due to an innate fault in developmental potentiality or to an
satisfied with the substitutive gratifications which neurotic symptoms offer. They 'act
out' their neurotic impulses, in contrast to psychoneurotics, whose most important activity
is in their fantasy." ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 235.
39. Lying is a common psychic phenomenon. "The processes of self-deception in the
interest of self-esteem are very wide in our lives. We can readily distort our observa-
tions to maintain our self respect. This fact ... is not the prerogative of a criminal class
or of normal mankind under great stress. It is of the very stuff of the mind of man,"
West, supra note 7, at 780-1.
40. See GLUECIC, op. cit. .rupra note 7; HEALY & HEALY, op. cit. atpra note 7;
HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 387-90.
41. See HENDERSON & Gn.Ixspm, op. cit. supra note 6, at 433; MENNINGEI, op. cit. pra
note 17, at 148.
42. See HEALY & HEALY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 19, 100, passin; GLUECm,. Op. cit.
supra note 7; Karpman, supra note 7, at 153.
43. On mental defects generally, see HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 551-74; NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 521-44. See also ABEL, TnE SUDNORlMAL
ADOLESCENT GIRL (1942) ; BENDA, MONGOLISM & CRETINISM (1946).
It is possible for a mental defective to be disordered as well. "A psychosis In a
mental defective, however, is likely to be a rather colorless affair, since the patient does
not have a large stock of ideas with which to build up false notions about reality." OvEit-
HOLSER & RICHMOND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11.
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arrest in developmental progress. As a result, the defective cannot under-
stand and make proper use of the complex features of his environment.
Mental defectives, commonly known as the "feebleminded," 4 are clas-
sified as idiots, imbeciles, and morons. The idiot has a mental age ranging
up to three years, the imbecile from four to seven, and the moron from
eight to twelve.45 While idiots and imbeciles seldom appear as -,itnesses,
morons often do."' They may appear good-looking and alert. Nonetheless,
they are usually highly suggestible 47 and prone to give erroneous testimony,




To the psychiatrist, there is no line of demarcation between mind and
body. The psyche and sorna are but different aspects of the human organism,
the processes of which are integrated to form one psychobiological whole.19
To discover a "mental" disturbance, therefore, the psychiatrist studies the
entire human organism-the evolution of the personality, as well as the
somatic factors. This usually requires a physical examination "I and a com-
44. The "feebleminded" include cretins, mongoloids, hydrocephalics, and microce-
phalics. The category also includes persons suffering from defects associated with pre-
natal disease or with diseases occurring in infancy or early childhood. See sources cited
note 43 supra.
45. This is the classification adopted by the American Association on Mental Defi-
ciency. See NoyEs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 528.
High-grade idiots may understand the simplest words, but can rarely articulate them.
High-grade imbeciles learn to read one-syllable words and can follow elementary instruc-
tions. forons can usually read and write and perform simple, routine work, but generally
find it impossible to make a successful social adjustment. See HnxannsoNz & Gi.rsPE,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 551-74; NoYEs, op. cit. stpra note 16, at 521-44.
46. See, e.g., Territory v. Titcomb, 34 Hawaii 499 (1938) ; People v. Hudson, 341
Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930).
47. As one goes down the intellectual scale, remarkable increases in suggestibility ap-
pear. See BuRtr, Lnro.a. PSYcHOLOGY 111 (1931).
48. See OvE uoLsmi & RicHmOND, op. cit. stpra note 6, at 51-2. See also Goddard's
acute observation: "It is a notorious fact that men . . . refuse to admit a girl is feeble-
minded if she is pretty." GODDARD, HUZMAN EFFICIENCY AND LavELs o I:,rELUJGENc 14
(1920).
49. The term "clinical" refers here to enxaminations conducted either in a psychiatric
clinic or in a psychiatrist's private office.
50. "Man is a unitary organism or being whose physical, mental, emotional, and social
reactions constitute but different aspects of one individual whole vhich functions as a
unit, The mind therefore is but one of the . . . functions of these organisms and not
an entity having an existence parallel with the body.... If a person says 'I am sad'
the questions 'Where am I sad?' or 'WXith what am I sad?' do not occur to him. His
sadness, anger or good spirits are total reactions-integrated psyciobiological responses
of the organism." NOYEs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 18-19. This is frequently referred to
as the "organismic theory." See Ov--moLsrm & RIc.NMoND, op. cit. Vipra note 6, at S.
51. For example, the accusations of a sex prosecutrix may result in large part from
vaginal irritations. See HEALy & HEALY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 182.
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plete case history, together with a mental examination to probe tile per-
sonality in all its aspects. The patient's moods, activity, stream of thought,
perception, memory, and insight must all be studied.52 In conducting this
analysis, the psychiatrist may employ a host of psychoanalytical and
psychological 11 tests to probe the patient's psychic determinants and gen-
eral intelligence. 4
After thorough clinical examination, 5 the psychiatrist integrates the data
secured from the biological, psychological, social, and other fields of in-
quiry. The personality disorder or defect is then diagnosed by analyzing
and reconstructing the dynamic factors in its production. 6
Courtroom Diagnosis
When a psychiatrist has not made a clinical examination of a witness,
the question arises whether he can render a competent opinion solely on the
basis of data presented in court.57 Courtroom information which may shed
52. For detailed accounts of the methods of psychiatric examination, see HENDERSON &
GILasPIE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 83-100, 545-50, 563-74; NOYES, op. cit. supra note 16,
at 139-61.
53. While psychology studies behavior in general, psychoanalysis is a method of
exploring the mental life, based on the teachings of Freud, Jung, and Adler. An excellent
discussion of psychoanalytic therapy is ALEXANDER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 272-300. For
a good history of psychoanalysis, see BRILL, FREUD'S CONTaRIUTION TO PSYCuATRY
(1944).
Most psychiatrists, as doctors specializing in mental disorders, draw heavily on the
knowledge and techniques of both psychology and psychoanalysis. See OVERHOLSEm AND
RIcnHmOND, op. cit. sipra note 6, at 2-8.
54. The Binet-Siinon I.Q. test, standardized by Terman, is particularly useful for
gauging mental defects. See TERMAN & MERRILL, MEASURING INTELLIGENCE (1937). In
the Rorschack Test, which seeks to explore perceptual organization, a patient is shown a
series of inkblots and asked what they represent. See RORSCnACK, PSYCUODIAGNOSTICS
(1942). In the Thematic Apperception Test, he is shown photographs of situations and
asked to make up a story. See MURRAY, EXPLORATION IN PERSONALITY (1938). For a
rdsum6 of these and other psychological and psychoanalytical testing devices, see MEN-
N IzGER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 175-80.
55. Examination may take anywhere from a few days to a month. See Weilhofen,
Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 MiciU. L, Rnv. 961, 96!
(1950). But in any case, ". . . a thirty-day period is generally sufficient for diagnosis."
Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Lawrence Freedman, Psychiatrist, Yale
Medical School, dated June 19, 1950, in Yale Law Library.
56. "Of course, the patient's cooperation is very important. Without it, the psy-
chiatrist may not be able to make a diagnosis. But even where the patient is unwilling, a
formulation can sometimes be made." Ibid.
57. A person qualifying as an expert can be asked a hypothetical question provided
it is based on evidence adduced in court. The jury can then disregard the expert's opinion
if it does not believe the evidence upon which the opinion is grounded. As such, the
hypothetical is a logical device to give expert aid to the jury. See 2 WiGMoRE, §§ 672-81.
The hypothetical, however, is subject to serious objections. An attorney can, if he
wishes, include in the hypothetical only facts favorable to his side, thereby strait-jacket-
ing and antagonizing experts. Moreover, long and biased hypotheticals may be forgotten
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light on a witness' personality is of three types: the witness' demeanor; his
answers to questions on the stand; and extrinsic evidence of his past activ-
ities.
Demeanor. During a witness' entire performance in court, a psychiatrist
can observe his dress, gait, posture, gestures, voice, and any peculiarities in
physical appearance.53 He can likewise study aspects of the witness' per-
sonality, such as his attitude or mood and the intensity of his emotions,
which are often suggested by muscular tensions, postures, and other phys-
ical expressions.,9 While some of these characteristics may be distorted by
the witness' uneasiness on the stand or by his hostility to the cross-examiner,
a psychiatrist, with his experience in assessing demeanor,"° can make al-
lowance for variables of this sort.
The Witness' testimony. While the direct examination may, in rare cases,
elicit meaningful psychiatric data from the witness, cross-examination will
ordinarily be the primary source. It usually allows full probe of a witness'
general mental state, intellect, perception, memory, and cogitative facul-
ties." Cross-examination may also be used to obtain as much of a case
history as the witness himself will relate.12 Furthermore, it may sometimes
expose litigious paranoidal tendencies where counsel are permitted to ques-
tion a plaintiff about prior suits he has brought. 3 Similarly, prior acts of
by the jury while the expert opinion remains impressed on their mind. 2 id. § 632. Wig-
more has advocated that the hypothetical be abolished. Instead, where the expert has read
or listened to any of the testimony given in court, Wigmore would allow him to state his
conclusion as soon as he begins to testify. The bases for his opinion could then be brought
out on direct or cross-examination. 2 id. § 686. For an invaluable collection of materials
on expert testimony, see 2 LAW & Coinmsn'. Pron. 401 (1935). See also McCormick,
Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Tsx. L. Rm: 109
(1945).
58. The demeanor of a witness on the stand may ahays be considered in evaluating
his credibility, and demeanor is alvays assumed to be in evidence. 3 WIGom. §946.
But cf. Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 33 A.2d 124 (1943) (in alienation of affections
case, findings of trial court based in part upon observation of plaintiff's wife and defendant
in courtroom, held error). On the importance of demeanor evidence generally, see 5
WiGmoRE § 1395.
59. On the importance of these factors for diagnostic purposes, see Hsxnsnso:: &
GiT sPiE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 93-5; NoYEs, op. cit. stpra note 16, at 149-54.
60. See note 52 supra.
61. See, e.g., People ex ret. Taylor v. Smalley, 121 Misc. 331, 201 N.Y.S. 39 (1923);
Roberts v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 418, 35 S.W2d 175 (1931). A collection of cases
by jurisdiction can be found in 3 NVsIGURE § 987. For a careful analysis of the various
rules governing the scope of the cross-examination, see Note, 24 IowA L. Rv. 564 (1939).
62. A good example is the cross-examination of Whittaker Chambers in the first and
second perjury trials of Alger Hiss. See N.Y. Times, June 3, 1949, p. 1, col. S; June 4,
1950, p. 1, col. 4; June 7, 1949, p. 1, col. 1; June 8, 1949, p. 1, col. 1; Nov. 23, 1949, p. 1, col. 2;
Nov. 24, 1949, p. 1, col. 2; Nov. 29, p. 1, col. 2. See also note 92 infra.
63. See, e.g., Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass'n, 127 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (plaintiff
in personal injury action questioned regarding previous claims for injuries) ; Johnson v.
Richards, 50 Idaho 150, 294 Pac. 507 (1930) (wife, in suit for alienation of husband's
affections questioned about accusations of women other than defendant). To prevent un-
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misconduct, sexual or otherwise, may be revealed." Finally, the psychiatrist
may direct the cross-examination, thereby approximating a personal inter-
view with the witness.
66
Extrinsic aidence. While cross-examination is generally controlled solely
by the policy of relevancy, extrinsic testimony is further governed by the
auxiliary policies of preventing confusion of issues, unfair surprise, and un-
due prejudice." As a result, information of vital import to the psychiatrist
may be excluded.
Efforts to attack a witness' veracity by extrinsic evidence must follow a
few well-defined channels. If a witness has been convicted of a felony, the
conviction can be introduced in evidence to cast doubt on his veracity," since
it is irrebuttable proof of an act which supposedly indicates a character
fair prejudice to the plaintiff, however, courts have sometimes limited such questioning.
See 3 WIGmORE § 963.
64. In a few states only prior acts of misconduct which affect veracity may be ex-
posed on cross-examination. E.g., Shailer v. Bullock, 78 Conn. 65, 61 Ati. 65 (1905).
But generally the extent of questioning about prior misconduct is left entirely to the trial
court's discretion. E.g., Territory v. Chavez, 8 N.M. 528, 45 Pac. 1107 (1896). A famous
example of a court's failure to exercise such discretion is Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass,
369, 151 N.E. 839 (1926), noted in 36 YALE L.J. 384 (1927). See, generally, 3 WIomon
99 982-8; Ladd, .sipra note 9, at 184.
While Wigmore feels that in most instances cross-examination should be limited to
misconduct affecting veracity, he favors wide open cross-examination of sex prosecutrices
about prior immorality and illicit conduct. -In such cases, he feels, chastity may bear
directly on truth-telling capacity, so that full inquiry into the social and mental history
should be permitted. 3 WIGMORE § 982. For a recent case in accord with Wigmore's
views, see Redmon v. State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948), noted in 28 N.B, L. Ray.
132 (1948). Wigmore further proposes that no judge should allow a sex offense to go to the
jury unless the prosecutrix' mental makeup and social history have been examined and
testified to by a psychiatrist. 3 WIGMORE § 924a.
65. In the first Hiss trial, for example, Hiss' attorney conferred with Dr. Carl Binger
during the cross-examination of Whittaker Chambers. N.Y. Times, June 7, 1949, p, 1,
col. 1. But Dr. Binger was not allowed to testify at this trial. See note 92 infra.
66. See 3 WGMzORE § 878. These auxiliary policies, however, are seldom articulated
by courts. Instead, they use the word "relevancy," when they really mean "legal rele-
vancy." See James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 689 (1941).
67. At common law a conviction for a felony, or for a misdemeanor involving dis-
honesty (crinen falsi), rendered the convicted person incompetent as a witness. 2 Wwi-
momE § 520; Ladd, stupra note 9, at 174.
This disqualification generally has been removed by statutes, which provide instead
that conviction of crime shall be admissible to impeach. The statutes, however, vary
widely in their wording and interpretation as to what crimes are admissible for this pur-
pose. Some courts hold that the crime must be one that would disqualify at common law.
Melaragero v. United States, 88 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Card v. Foot, 57 Conn, 427,
18 Atl. 713 (1889). Others say it must be a crime involving moral turpitude. Grammer
v. State, 239 Ala. 633, 196 So. 268 (1940). Yet others allow conviction for any crime, in-
cluding misdemeanors not reflecting on credibility. Quigley v. Turner, 150 Mass. 108, 22
N.E. 586 (1889). For a compilation of the statutes and decisions in the various states, see
3 WIGIAOE § 987.
[Vol. 59: 13241334
1950] PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION ABNORMAL WITNESS 1335
flaw.6 But past acts of misconduct for which the witness was never con-
victed may not be proved extrinsically, for fear that rebuttal and litigation
of these acts may confuse the jury.c9 Prior suits and claims of a plaintiff-wit-
ness which may denote litigious paranoia are excluded for the same reason. 70
Similarly, a witness' ordinary case-history, less directly relevant to veracity
than prior acts of misconduct or prior suits and claims, is rarely admissible.
A witness' veracity may always be attacked, however, by evidence of a bad
reputation for truthfulness in the community." The bearing of such evidence
on a witness' credibility is felt to be sufficiently strong to outweigh any con-
fusion which might ensue from collateral litigation of that reputation.
Aside from attacks on a witness' veracity, counsel may seek by extrinsic
evidence to show shortcomings in the witness' powers of observation and
recollection. But when such evidence is offered by anyone other than a
psychiatrist, courts generally admit it only if the defect is linked to in-
sanity.
72
Those courts which admit extrinsic evidence of drug addiction treat it as a
category unto itself. 73 Some of these admit such evidence only when it is
68. As Justice Holmes put it, ". . . [W]hen it is proved that a witness has been con-
victed of a crime, the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the
general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that
general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular
case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he
was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself and it reaches that conclusion solely
through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit."
Gertz v. Fitchberg R.., 137 Mfass. 77, 78 (1S84).
Psychiatrically speaking, however, a single criminal act is not in itself sufficient proof
of a personality-type. See Ladd, supra note 9, at 178.
69. 3 ViGmoma § 979. The other auxiliary policies of preventing unfair surprise and
undue prejudice may also operate here, on the theory that it is unfair to require that a
witness be prepared to rebut alleged acts that may range over his entire life. Ibid.
70. 3 id. § 963.
71. 3 id. § 923. Some courts admit evidence of bad general character. A majority,
however, feel that general qualities of character are too broad and vary too much with the
person judging them, while everyone can discuss qualities related to veracity. See 3 id.
§§ 922-4; cases cited in 90 A.L.R. 870 (1934).
The rule that character must be proved by reputation alone, which developed from a
misunderstanding of the earlier English cases, is supported on two grounds today: that it
excludes lay opinions (which give no aid to the jury), and that otherwise character proof
might be based on some limited personal experience or prejudice. See 7 IVxGoMOn
§§ 1918, 1985-6; Ladd, supra note 69, at 509-18. But the early common law rule, which
allowed character proof that was based on personal knowledge or belief, seems highly
preferable to the present American practice. See 7 WIIOao § 1986.
72. 3 WVIGM-oRE §§ 931-2. See also note 19 stpra.
Any reputable practicing physician, although not a specialist in mental illnesses, can
testify to insanity. Weihofen, supra note 55, at 962. Even lay testimony regarding in-
sanity is sometimes admitted. State v. fadena, 165 La. 474, 115 So. 661 (1928) ; State
v. Witherspoon, 210 N.C. 647, 188 S.E. 111 (1936). See 2 WVbaooE § 568; 3 id. §§ 933-8.
73. Some courts exclude evidence of drug addiction altogether. E.g., State v. King,
88 Minn. 175, 92 N.W. 965 (1903) ; Katleman v. State, 104 Neb. 62, 175 N.W. 671 (1919).
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supported by competent testimony that the memory is probably, or in
fact, impaired. 74 Other courts always admit evidence of the drug habit on
the theory that habitual use of drugs indicates moral degeneracy incom-
patible with veracity,75 or that it results in pathological lying.70 But while
habitual use of alcohol may be as probative psychiatrically as drug addic-
tion,77 courts traditionally exclude all extrinsic evidence of chronic al-
coholism.
78
Summary. Concededly, a psychiatrist operates at optimum capacity in a
clinical examination. But despite restrictive rules of evidence and the court-
room atmosphere, enough data may be presented in court to provide the
basis for a psychiatric diagnosis 79 which will be helpful to the jury. For
example, by correlating all the factors of a witness' personality, a psychi-
atrist may sometimes be able to detect a pathological liar in the courtroom
as easily as in the clinic.80 These factors may include the witness' ability
to adjust quickly to exposure of his lies, a case history denoting bizarre,
insensitive, or paranoidal tendencies, and any convictions or indications
of a bad reputation for veracity extrinsically revealed.- Thus, whenever a
qualified psychiatrist believes that he can make a competent courtroom
diagnosis, the court should allow him to do so. Despite any shortcomings in
74. Kelly v. Maryland Casualty Co., 45 F.2d 782 (W.D. Va, 1929); cases cited in
15 A.L.R. 912 (1921). See 3 WIGMORE § 934.
75. Beland v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. Rep. 285, 217 S.W. 147 (1920) ; State v. Concan-
non, 25 Wash. 327, 65 Pac. 534 (1901) ; State v. Prentice, 192 Iowa 207, 183 N.W. 411
(1921) semble.
76. State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233 (1916) ; cf. Effinger v. Effinger, 48
Nev. 205, 209, 239 Pac. 801 (1925) (doctor testified that witness a dope addict and that
dope addicts are not to be believed). For further cases and discussion generally, see
Rossman, Testimony of the Drug Addicts, 3 ORE. L. REv. 81 (1924) ; Comment, 16 So.
CAiF. L. REv. 333 (1943).
77. Chronic alcoholism and drug addiction are both commonly symptomatic of neu-
roses. It is useless to generalize about which anaesthetic has the greater effect on the
moral faculties. In every case there are numerous variables, such as the amount of
anaesthetic consumed, kind of drug, and the personal equation of the patient. See ALx-
ANDER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 240-41; HENDERSON & GiLLESpr, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 427-30,433-40; NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 232-5, 239-46; Ovuanusna & RICHMoNon,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 90, 96-8.
78. E.g., Woods v. Dailey, 211 II. 495, 71 N.E. 1068 (1904); State v. Castle, 133
N.C. 769, 46 S.E. 1 (1903). The distinction which courts make between alcohol and
drugs may be due to the general acceptability of drinking in our community, as opposed to
the strong moral opprobrium attached to the taking of drugs.
Intoxication, however, at the time of the event testified to, or at time of trial, may
affect a witness' capacity to observe or recollect. Thus, a general habit of intemperance
during a given month may be admitted to show probable intoxication on a certain day of
that month. E.g., Kuenster v. Woodhouse, 101 Wis. 216, 77 N.W. 165 (1898). By this
technique alcoholism may sometimes be shown despite the general rule excluding the
habit itself.
79. For a contrary view, see Bendiner, The Ordeal of Alger Hiss, Nation, Feb. 11,
1950, p. 123.
80. HEALY & HEALY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 256.
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a diagnosis of this sort, the psychiatrist is better qualified than a lay jury to
assess personality disorders.
PRESENT USE OF PSYCHIATRISTS
Courts have not always welcomed psychiatric diagnoses in discovering
disorders and defects likely to impair a witness' credibility s8 While evidence
of extreme mental derangement verging on insanity is clearly admissible, -
judges have sometimes barred expert diagnosis of the lesser mental illnesses. 83
This attitude stems from the erroneous assumption that while the line
between sanity and insanity is a clear one, the diagnosis of any lesser dis-
order or defect is based on speculation and inference. Once in the realm of
speculation, psychiatrists are in no better position than lay jurors to deter-
mine the truth-telling capacity of a disordered witness. And, the argument
proceeds, there may be too much disagreement among the psychiatrists,
leading to a battle of experts.
But the notion that psychiatry lacks definite guideposts for classifying
the minor disorders and defects overlooks the realities of modern medicine. 4
Personality disorders below the level of psychosis and mental defects above
the level of imbecility have been recognized for decades,8 and their effects
81. "We have collected an enormous material about the fallibility of testimony; but
criminal justice often acts as if there were no perjury, no error in identification, no hysteria
of female witnesses, no fantastic stories of children trembling on the witness-stand."
Hirschberg, Pathology of Criminal Jtutlce, 31 J. OF CRru. L. & CRIUNOLOGY 536, 538
(1941).
82. See 3 WIGMORE § 932.
83. The first Hiss trial, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1949, p. 1, col 2 (courtroom diagnosis of
psychopathic personality excluded) ; Commonwealth v. Meyers, 5 Pa. D. & C. 410 (1924)
(clinical diagnosis of impaired mental condition and subnormal intelligence, made two
years before trial, excluded) ; State v. Driver, 88 XV. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921) (court-
room diagnosis of untrustworthy moral pervert).
The rationale of the exclusion in both the Meyers and Drhcr cases, supra, was that
opinion evidence assailing a witness' veracity must be based on knowledge of the witness'
reputation for veracity in his community. This rationale fails, however, if a psychiatrist's
testimony is regarded as expcrt, because only ordinary character witnesses are confined to
general reputation for veracity. See notes 57 and 71 supra. As Judge Goddard in the
second Hiss trial significantly noted, in distinguishing the Driver case, "The court indi-
cated that it would not allow him [the psychiatrist] to be qualified as an expert. This
was in 1921-before the value of psychiatry had been recognized." United States v. Hiss,
88 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also note 92 infra.
The ground on which psychiatric testimony was excluded in the first Hiss case is un-
known, since there was no written opinion.
84. Consider, for example, the practice of the United States government in World War
II, in discharging soldiers for lesser psychiatric disturbances. A total of 388,600 neuropsy-
chiatric cases were given medical discharges, and an additional 163,000 persons, including
those with mental deficiency, psychopathic personality, drug addiction, alcoholism and
homosexuality, were given administrative discharges. MENNINGER, PsYcn 'ra ,- i A
TRouRLED WORLD 343 (1948).
85. This recognition has led some states to repudiate the orthodox notions of crim-
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on credibility are scientifically ascertainable. And while psychiatrists may
sometimes disagree among themselves," this possibility exists whenever
experts testify,"' and no valid reason appears for drawing the line at psy-
chiatry.
Many courts have indeed come to realize that psychiatry can render
valuable assistance in assessing the lesser mental disturbances. Judicial
appreciation of psychiatry has been most pronounced in sex offense cases.
Recognizing that false sex charges may stem from the psychic complexes
of a female who appears normal to the layman, courts have permitted
psychiatrists to expose mental defects,88 hysteria,89 and pathological lying 11
in sex prosecutrices. The liberal attitude in this area 91 is probably due to the
gravity of the charge; to the general lack of corroborating evidence; and
perhaps to a popular feeling that sex is peculiarly within the ken of psy-
chiatrists.
inal responsibility, see note 19 supra, and to provide instead for commitment to a mental in-
stitution when the defendant is a mental defective or psychopathic personality. See, e.g.,
MASS. ANN. LAws c. 123, §§ 113-15 (Supp. 1948); VT. STAT. §§6699-6703 (1947). See
also Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally I1, 24 TEx. L. Rav. 307 (1946).
86. But see People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930) (principal witness
in arson case examined by three physicians, all of whom gave same diagnosis, despite fact
that one was appointed by the prosecution, another by the defense, and the third by the
court).
And see Overholser's statement: "[M]any of the disagreements are more apparent
than real, thanks to the hypothetical question, [and] the refusal to permit the expert wit-
ness to explain his views and the reasons therefore...." Overholser, The Place of
Psychiatry in the Criminal Law, 16 B.U.L. Rlv. 322, 328 (1936). See also Weihofen,
supra note 55, at 962.
87. See 2 WIaaroE § 563. Moreover, where there is considerable disagreement, the
jury can always disregard the psychiatric testimony entirely. See 2 id. § 673.
88. Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571 (1916). Accord, State v. Teager, 222
Iowa 391, 269 N.W. 348 (1936) (evidence of prosecutrix' subnormal mentality would have
been allowed for impeachment purposes if defense had not failed to object to prosecutrix'
competency).
89. Mell v. State, 133 Ark. 197, 202 S.W. 33 (1918); State v. Pryor, 74 Wash, 121,
132 Pac. 874 (1913) ; Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928).
90. People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929) ; State v. Wesler, I N.J.
58, 59 A.2d 834 (1948), noted in Comment, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CaIrINOLOGY 750 (1949)
Mdiller v. State, 49 Okla. Cr. 133, 295 Pac. 403 (1930).
91. See, however, one writer's statement that in sex eases a "majority of courts refuse
to admit the opinions of psychiatrists and social workers as to the moral and mental
character of a witness. . . ." Comment, 39 J. CaRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 750, 752-3 (1949).
This view is not borne out by the reported sex cases in which psychiatrists have been
offered. See notes 83, 88-90 supra. Courts do exclude opinions as to a witness' mental and
moral character, however, when offered by persons other than psychiatrists. E.g., Ah
Tong v. Earl Fruit Co., 112 Cal. 679, 45 Pac. 7 (1896) ; Abbott v. State, 113 Neb. 517, 204
N.W. 74 (1925). Contra, State v. Witherspoon, 210 N.C. 647, 188 S.E. 111 (1936)
(constable's statement that prosecutrix "not a normal girl mentally," held admissible).
And in State v. Teager, 222 Iowa 391, 269 N.W. 248 (1936), a schoolteacher's offer to
testify that a rape prosecutrix was "subnormal mentally" was excluded only because the
prosecutrix' competency had not been challenged.
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But there is no reason to restrict this attitude to sex cases. Whenever a
psychiatrist can expose personality disturbances that may affect a witness'
credibility, the policy of admitting any relevant material demands that he
be heard. Thus, in the recent prejury trial of Alger Hiss, 2- a forthright fed-
eral court accepted a diagnosis based entirely on courtroom observation.
The psychiatrist called by the defense was permitted to testify that in his
opinion Whittaker Chambers, one of the prosecution's star witnesses, was
a psychopathic personality with "a tendency towards making false accu-
sations." 93
The Desirability of Clinical Examination
Although courtroom diagnosis is better than nothing, the full potential-
ities of psychiatric guidance will not be realized until all diagnosis is based
upon a full clinical examination. Courtroom techniques for probing person-
ality are perforce limited. Although the psychiatrist, by directing cross-
examination, may approximate a personal interview, he is deprived of direct
rapport with the witness, often essential to diagnosis. A case history ob-
tained on cross-examination may be incomplete. Questioning can be limited
by the judge at his discretion. And an uneasy or hostile witness, antagonized
or awed by the ominous atmosphere of the courtroom, may be reticent or
evasive. Vital information withheld by the witness on cross-examination
may never be brought out due to restrictive rules of evidence. Past acts of
misconduct, chronic alcoholism, or traits of litigious paranoia, for example,
may never be divulged.
To provide juries with maximum psychiatric assistance, courts should
92. There were two trials. In the first trial, Dr. Carl Binger, the psychiatrist, vms
not allowed to testify. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1949, p. 1, col. 2. His testimony was ad-
mitted, however, in the second trial. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).
The Hiss ruling does not stand alone as an example of judicial appreciation of
psychiatry in cases other than sex cases. Cofln v. Reichard, 148 F2d 278 (6th Cir. 1945)
(hospital records showing that appellant in habeas corpus proceeding was a psychopathic
personality, admitted) ; People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930) (testimony
of three experts that 42-year-old principal witness in an arson case was a moron) ; Pool
v. Day, 143 Kan. 226, 53 P.2d 912 (1936) (expert testimony that plaintiff-witness suffered
from "retrograde amnesia") ; Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. Rep. 419, 222 SMW. 555
(1920) (exclusion of evidence that prosecuting witness in robbery case was feebleminded,
held erroneous). See U.S. v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945) (extrinsic
evidence that a witness has been in mental institution is admissible to impeach).
93. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1950, p. 1, col. 2. In describing psychopathic personality,
Dr. Binger said it was "not the conventional note of insanity," but rather a personality
deviation characterized by amoral and asocial conduct. Ibld. For the various factors
upon which Dr. Binger based his diagnosis, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, p. 8, Col. 5. The
defense also called as a witness Dr. Henry A. Murray, a clinical psychologist from Har-
vard, who supported Dr. Binger's conclusions. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1950, p. 9, col. 4.
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order clinical 9 4 examination of any witness 15 by a court-appointed psychi-
atrist 96 upon a reasonable showing that the witness may be suffering from
a mental illness likely to affect his credibility. If the witness refuses to sub-
mit to the examination,97 the court could stay the proceedings or dismiss
94. Public clinics are generally available for the conduct of such examinations. In
some of our larger cities, for example, psychiatric clinics are utilized by municipal, see
Olson, The Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 92 CENT. L.J.
102 (1921); Weihofen, Hospital Examination of Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 419, 427 (1935), and juvenile courts. See HEALY, TuE INDIVIDUAL De-
LINQUENT (1929). For a collection of statutes, see 8 WIGMORE § 2220. State hospitals
are also available. In at least 13 states, judges can commit criminal defendants to state
hospitals for observation when the defendant's sanity is in issue. See Weihofen, supra
note 55, at 965-74. See also notes 49 supra and 96 infra.
95. While this procedure would be used most often to impeach a plaintiff or a wit-
ness for the prosecution, see pages 1338-9 supra, a defendant who takes the stand and
witnesses who testify in his behalf should not be exempt. Like the plaintiff and his
witnesses, they may be impeached. 3 WIGcIOan § 890. And when their credibility is in
issue they should be examined upon a showing of probable mental illness.
96. Judges can appoint psychiatrists under their inherent constitutional power to
summon witnesses. See 9 WIGMoRE § 2484. And in several states, they are empowered by
statute to appoint experts wherever they feel the need. See 2 id. § 563; 8 id. § 2220 for
a collection of these statutes. Exercising their powers, trial judges have appointed psy-
chiatrists to examine witnesses whose competency was questioned by opposing counsel.
E.g., People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930) ; Commonwealth v. Koch, 305
Pa. 146, 157 Atl. 479 (1931). And in Goodwin v. State, 114 Wis. 318, 321, 90 N.W. 170,
171 (1902), the court stated that examination may be imposed as a condition precedent to
testifying where the court is seriously doubtful of a witness' mental competency.
In the Hudson case, supra, the voir dire, see note 11 supra, served as a procedural
device for obtaining clinical diagnosis which was later available to impeach the witness.
In State v. Palmer, 206 Minn. 185, 288 N.W. 160 (1939), moreover, psychiatric examina-
tion was allowed after the witness left the stand; the diagnosis based on this examination
was then used to impeach the witness. This is the closest -a court has come to court-
ordered examination for the purpose of impeachment. In Goodwin v. State, supra, how-
ever, the court refused to order an examination for the purpose of impeaching an alleged
"hysteric" after she left the stand.
Of course, there may be cases where a diagnosis is already available because the wit-
ness has had psychiatric treatment either privately or in a mental hospital or clinic. And
while the witness may prevent admission of such diagnosis by invoking the doctor-patient
privilege, 8 WIGMORE § 2382; see also Chafee, Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing
the Doctor's Mouth?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943), the privilege is not universal: it exists
by statute in about two-thirds of the states. See 8 WIGMoRE § 2380. Under certain circum-
stances, moreover, it may be waived. See 8 id. § 2388. Where the privilege is not in force,
or where it has been waived, the trial court should use its discretion in deciding whether
a court-appointed psychiatrist would provide a more impartial diagnosis.
97. A "refusal to submit" includes a refusal to cooperate with the psychiatrist, see
note 56 supra, when such refusal makes a diagnosis impossible. There is no reason to
assume, however, that witness will generally refuse to submit. Witnesses have consented
to psychiatric examinations and have been diagnosed when their competency to testify
was challenged by opposing counsel. See, e.g., Territory v. Titcomb, 34 Hawaii 499
(1938) ; People v. Hudson, 341 Ill. 187, 173 N.E. 278 (1930).
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the case (if he is the plaintiff or prosecuting witness), or it could bar him
from testifying.
The only serious objection to compulsory clinical examination is that a
witness should not be forced to reveal the intimate details of his lifeY3 But
here the individual's right to privacy is outweighed by the need for getting
at the truth, especially where the fate of an innocent defendant hangs in the
balance.9 And if the witness is normal, his privacy will remain intact, since
nobody but the psychiatrist will have heard the witness' life history. More-
over, a witness' privacy is always jeopardized as soon as he takes the stand,
and impartial psychiatric examination is certainly more scientific and affords
greater protection to the individual than the existing impeachment devices
available to opposing counsel."'0
CONCLUSION
Without the benefit of psychiatric assistance a jury may of course make
the proper evaluation of an abnormal witness' credibility. But its decision
is at best an intuitive guess; good luck alone can make it correct. Aided by
expert analysis, the jury can at least make an informed guess, with greater
chances for success. Psychiatric diagnosis should be admitted whenever it is
offered, whether based on clinical examination or courtroom observation
alone.
98. Along these lines, the objection might also be raised that clinical examination
would violate the witness' privilege against self-incrimination. See 8 WoRoan §§ 2"250-51.
But such incrimination can only arise if the witness answers incriminating questions truth-
fully. To begin with, he need not answer such questions at all. And if he does answer
truthfully, the psychiatrist can omit the incriminating incidents when he relates in court
the bases for his diagnosis.
An additional objection might be that the doctor-patient privilege, see note 96 supra,
precludes the psychiatrist from reporting his diagnosis to the jury. But there is no reason
to extend this much criticized privilege to compulsory examinations, since it applies
only to voluntary consultation for curative treatment. 8 WIcGUoRE § 232.
99. Indeed, psychiatric impeachment has been used most often against civil plaintiffs
and prosecuting witnesses. See pages 1338-9 spra.
100. Court-ordered examinations have additional advantages. Although the parties'
own psychiatrists could participate in these examinations and present their findings to
the jury, impartial diagnoses by court-appointed experts would invariably be given more
weight when psychiatrists disagree. See Weihofen, supra note 55, at 967. And psychia-
trists would be more willing to testify on the basis ot clinical examinations to avoid the
hypothetical question made necessary by courtroom diagnosis. See note 57 supra.
